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The Fed’s Monetary Policy Rule
William Poole
I’ve chosen a title designed to be provocative,
for I suspect that few consider current Federal
Reserve policy as characterized by a monetary
rule. My logic is this: There is now a large body
of evidence, which I’ll review shortly, that Fed
policy has been highly predictable over the past
decade or so. If the market can predict the Fed’s
policy actions, then it must be the case that Fed
policy follows a rule, or policy regularity, of some
sort. My purpose is to explore the nature of that
rule. Contrary to Simons’s implication, the behav-
ior of authorities can be predictable.
Before digging into specifics, consider what
the “rules versus discretion” debate is about.
Advocates of discretion, as I interpret them, are
primarily arguing against a formal policy rule, and
certainly against a legislated rule. They believe
that policy will be more effective if characterized
by “discretion.”
Discretion surely cannot mean that policy is
haphazard, capricious, random, or unpredictable.
Advocates of discretion agree with Simons that
“many special responsibilities...may wisely be
delegated to administrative authorities with sub-
stantial discretionary power.” However, they do
not agree with Simons that discretion “is utterly
inappropriate in the monetary field.”
Interestingly, Simons argued that a fixed
money stock would be the best rule, but only if
I
n 1936, Henry Simons published a paper,
“Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary
Policy,” that not only became a classic but
also is still highly relevant to today’s policy
debates.1 I rediscovered several important points
in the paper while preparing this lecture.
In thinking about policy rules in recent years,
I have tended to separate the political and econ-
omic cases for a rule. Simons argues for a much
more integrated view of the issue: 
There are, of course, many special responsi-
bilities which may wisely be delegated to
administrative authorities with substantial
discretionary power...The expedient must be
invoked sparingly, however, if democratic
institutions are to be preserved; and it is utterly
inappropriate in the monetary field. An enter-
prise cannot function effectively in the face of
extreme uncertainty as to the action of monetary
authorities or, for that matter, as to monetary
legislation.2
Thus, Simons argues that the rule of law that
characterizes a democracy is also required to
provide monetary policy predictability, which,
in turn, is necessary for efficient operation of a
market economy.
This article was originally presented as a speech at the Cato Institute, Washington, D.C., 
October 14, 2005.
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      substantial institutional reforms were in place in
financial markets, such as 100 percent reserve
requirements against bank deposits. Given the
institutional structure, Simons argued for a rule
focused on price-level stabilization, because “no
monetary system can function effectively or sur-
vive politically in the face of extreme alternations
of hoarding and dishoarding.”3 That is, Simons
believed that large variations in the velocity of
money would make a fixed money stock rule
work poorly. 
Despite the nature of his argument for a price-
level stabilization rule, elsewhere in the same
paper Simons argued that, “[o]nce well established
and generally accepted as the basis of anticipa-
tions, any one of many different rules (or sets of
rules) would probably serve about as well as
another.”4 I think his first argument was correct—
that different rules, even once fully understood,
would have different operating properties in the
economy, and that a choice among various possi-
ble rules should depend on which rule yields
better economic outcomes.
My view has evolved over time to this gen-
eral position: Monetary economists have not yet
developed a formal rule that is likely to have better
operating properties than the Fed’s current prac-
tice. It is highly desirable that policy practice be
formalized to the maximum possible extent. Or,
more precisely, monetary economists should
embark on a program of continuous improvement
and enhanced precision of the Fed’s monetary
rule. It is possible to say a lot about the system-
atic characteristics of current Fed practice, even
though I do not know how to write down the
current practice in an equation. It is in this sense
that I’ll be describing the Fed’s policy rule. And
given that, as far as I know, there is no other effort
to state in one place the main characteristics of
the Fed’s policy rule; I’m sure that subsequent
work will refine and correct the way I characterize
the rule. Thus, I am redefining the “rule” to fit
current practice, which has yielded an environ-
ment in which policy actions are highly, though
not perfectly, predictable in the markets.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments—especially Bob Rasche, senior vice presi-
dent and director of research.
POLICY PREDICTABILITY—
A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
I’ve discussed the predictability of Fed policy
decisions on a number of occasions, most recently
in a speech on October 4, 2005, entitled, “How
Predictable Is Fed Policy?” Let me summarize
the main findings.
Over the past decade, the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) has undertaken a number of
steps toward greater transparency that have greatly
improved the ability of markets to predict future
policy actions. Among these steps are the
announcement of policy actions at the conclusion
of each FOMC meeting; the restriction of policy
actions to regularly scheduled FOMC meetings,
except under extraordinary conditions; the
announcement of a specific numeric target for
the federal funds rate in the post-FOMC meeting
press releases and in the Directive to the Manager
of the open market desk at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York; the inclusion of the individual
votes at the FOMC meeting in the press release;
and the expedited release of the minutes of the
FOMC meetings. In addition, since 1989 all FOMC
policy actions to change the target for the funds
rate have been in multiples of 25 basis points. With
the exception of one change of 75 basis points,
all the changes have been either 25 or 50 basis
points.
As I have noted previously, I believe that the
evidence supports the conclusion that these steps
toward increased transparency have brought the
markets into much better “synch” with FOMC
thinking about appropriate policy actions. My
metric for judging how well markets have antici-
pated FOMC policy actions is the reaction of the
yield on the 1-month-ahead federal funds futures
contract between the close of business on the day
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3 Simons (1936, p. 5).
4 Simons (1936, p. 29).before the FOMC meets and the close of business
on the day of the meeting. Our research suggests
that changes of less than 5 basis points are
“noise.” Larger changes reflect surprises to mar-
ket expectations.
Since the middle of 1995, when the FOMC
has undertaken policy actions at regularly sched-
uled meetings, the markets have been surprised
only 12 times, as measured by a change of 5 basis
points or more in the 1-month-ahead federal funds
futures contract. Since the middle of 2003, when
the FOMC introduced “forward looking” language
into the press release, there have been no sur-
prises. In contrast, on all four occasions when the
FOMC instituted intermeeting policy actions, the
markets were taken by surprise.
On the other side of the coin, FOMC decisions
to leave the funds rate target unchanged have also
become largely predictable. Since the middle of
1995 there have been only two occasions when
the markets expected a change in the funds rate
target and the FOMC left it unchanged.
These findings open this question: What are
the circumstances under which market expecta-
tions of FOMC actions are adjusted, so that, by the
time the FOMC meets, the outcomes are generally
correctly foreseen? There is a substantial literature
documenting interest rate responses to arriving
information. Given that the federal funds futures
market predicts FOMC policy decisions quite
accurately, that literature provides insight into
how the FOMC responds to new information.
What I’ll do now is to step back from that level
of detail to discuss policy regularities at a high
level, starting with policy goals. 
POLICY GOALS
On many occasions, dating back to Paul
Volcker’s confirmation hearing in 1979, Fed offi-
cials have stated that the goal of low and stable
inflation is there because it maximizes the econ-
omy’s sustainable rate of economic growth.5
The dual mandate in the Federal Reserve Act,
as amended, and in other legislation provides for
goals of maximum purchasing power, usually
interpreted as price stability, and maximum
employment. There are two aspects to achieving
the employment goal. First, achieving low and
stable inflation maximizes the economy’s growth
potential and, probably, maximizes the sustainable
level of employment. Second, the Fed can enhance
employment stability through timely adjustments
in its policy stance. A subsidiary goal of general
financial stability is closely related to both infla-
tion and employment goals.
The Fed has gravitated to a specification of the
inflation goal stated in terms of the core personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) index. At the
FOMC meeting of December 21, 1999, Chairman
Greenspan provided a clear statement of the case
for focusing on the PCE price index rather than
on the consumer price index (CPI).
The reason the PCE deflator is a better indicator
in my view is that it incorporates a far more
accurate estimate of the weight of housing in
total consumer prices than the CPI. The latter is
based upon a survey of consumer expenditures,
which as we all know very dramatically under-
estimates the consumption of alcohol and
tobacco, just to name a couple of its compo-
nents. It also depends on people’s recollections
of what they spent, and we have much harder
evidence of that in the retail sales data, which
is where the PCE deflator comes from.6
There is evidence that the goal is effectively
a 1 to 2 percent annual rate of change, averaged
over a “reasonable” period whose precise defini-
tion depends on context. Evidence supporting
Poole
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 3
Senate, Ninety-eighth Congress, first session, The Renomination
of Paul A. Volcker to be Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System for a term of 4 years ending August 6, 1987,
July 14, 1983, p. 15; Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundredth Congress, first session,
The Nomination of Alan Greenspan of New York, to be a member
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the
unexpired term of 14 years from February 1, 1978, vice Paul A.
Volcker, resigned; and, to be Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System for a term of 4 years, vice Paul A. Volcker,
resigned, July 21, 1987, p. 29; Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs, United States House of Representatives, Testimony
of Alan Greenspan, February 23, 1988, reprinted in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, April 1988, p. 227.
6 FOMC Transcript, December 21, 1999, p. 49.
5 See, for example Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs,
United States Senate, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, Hearings
on the Nomination of Paul A. Volcker to be Chairman, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 30, 1979, p. 20;
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States this view of the inflation goal appears in the
minutes of the FOMC meetings of May 6, 2003,
and August 9, 2005.7
I regard inflation stability as the primary goal
not because it is more important in a welfare
sense than maximum employment but because
achieving low and stable inflation is prerequisite
to achieving employment goals. Inflation stability
also enhances, but does not guarantee, financial
stability.
I take note, but will not further discuss here,
the ongoing debate as to whether the inflation goal
should be formalized as a particular numerical
goal or range. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FED
POLICY RULE
The Fed policy rule has a number of elements
that can be identified and, in many cases, quanti-
fied. I’ll now discuss the most important of these.
The Taylor Rule
Statements and testimony of Chairmen
Volcker and Greenspan and other FOMC partici-
pants, supplemented by the transcripts and min-
utes of FOMC discussions over the past 25 years,
clearly indicate that the long-run objective of
Federal Reserve monetary policy is to maintain
price stability, usually phrased as “low and sta-
ble inflation.” In the short run, policy actions are
undertaken with the intention of alleviating or
moderating cyclical fluctuations, as Chairman
Greenspan has noted:
[M]onetary policy does have a role to play over
time in guiding aggregate demand into line with
the economy’s potential to produce. This may
involve providing a counterweight to major,
sustained cyclical tendencies in private spend-
ing, though we can not be overconfident in our
ability to identify such tendencies and to deter-
mine exactly the appropriate policy
response.8
Over 10 years ago, John Taylor (1993) noted
that these characteristics of FOMC policy actions
could be summarized in a simple expression:
where i is the nominal federal funds rate, p is the
inflation rate, p* is the target inflation rate, y is
the percentage deviation of real gross domestic
product (GDP) from a target, and r* is an estimate
of the “equilibrium” real federal funds rate.
Under this characterization of the systematic
or “rule like” character of FOMC policy actions,
the funds rate is raised (lowered) when actual
inflation exceeds (falls short of) the long-run infla-
tion objective and is raised (lowered) when output
exceeds (falls short of) a target level. In Taylor’s
example, the target for GDP was constructed from
a 2.2 percent per annum trend of real GDP starting
with the first quarter of 1984. In subsequent analy-
ses this target has been interpreted as a measure
of “potential GDP.” When inflation and real GDP
are on-target, then the policy setting of the real
funds rate is the estimated equilibrium value of
the real rate. This formulation of an interest rate
monetary policy rule satisfies McCallum’s prop-
erties for a rule that provides a “nominal anchor”
to the economy.9 Taylor showed that his equation
closely tracked the actual federal funds rate from
1987 through 1992 except around the stock market
crash in October 1987. 
For such a rule to be operational, data on the
inflation rate and GDP must be known to the
FOMC. In practice, the equation can be specified
with lagged data on inflation and GDP. More
generally the equation can be written as follows:
where p –
t–1 is the previous quarter’s PCE inflation
rate measured on a year-over-year basis, yt–1 is
the log of the previous quarter’s level of real GDP,
and yP
t–1 is the log of potential real GDP as esti-
mated by the Congressional Budget Office. To
ip p y y r p tt t t
P =− () + () ++ () −− − ab 11 1 100 ** * ln / ,
ip pp yr
pp y r p
=+ − () ++
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7 FOMC Minutes, May 6, 2003, www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/
minutes/20030506.htm; FOMC Minutes, August 9, 2005,
www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20050809.htm.
8 Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United States 
House of Representatives, testimony of Alan Greenspan, July 13,
1988. Reprinted in Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1988, p. 611.
9 McCallum (1981).Poole






































































































Greenspan Years: Funds Rate and Taylor Rules (p* = 1.5, r* = 2.3) a = 1.5, b = 0.8ensure a “nominal anchor” for the economy, the
coefficient a must be greater than 1.0.
Figure 1 shows the equation with the Taylor
coefficients (a = 1.5, b = 0.5), an assumed equilib-
rium real rate of interest of 2.0, and an assumed
inflation target of 1.5 percent. The solid blue line
shows the actual federal funds rate and the dashed
lines the two Taylor rule funds rates. The small-
dash black line is the rule constructed with the
core PCE inflation rate; the long-dash light blue
line with the PCE inflation rate.10 The average
differences between the two “Taylor rules” and
the actual funds rate over the entire period are
15 and 7 basis points, respectively. However, the
volatility of each of the two Taylor rules is much
less than that of the actual funds rate. 
Figure 2 shows the comparison of the two
Taylor rules with a larger coefficient on the output
gap (b = 0.8) and a slightly higher assumed equilib-
rium real rate (r* = 2.3). With these assumptions
the average differences between the two equations
and the funds rate over the entire period are 2 and
–3 basis points, respectively, and the volatility of
the two equations better approximates the volatil-
ity of the actual funds rate.
My purpose here is not to try to find the equa-
tion that reveals the policy rule of the Greenspan
Fed; as I stated earlier, I do not know how to write
down the current practice in an equation and the
FOMC certainly does not view itself as implement-
ing an equation. Rather, the illustrations should
be viewed as evidence in support of the proposi-
tion that the general contours of FOMC policy
actions are broadly predictable.
Policy Asymmetry
Under most circumstances the direction of
FOMC policy actions is “biased” in a sense I’ll
explain. Policy bias exists because turning points
Poole
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Monthly Changes in Nonfarm Payroll Employment: January 1947–August 2005
NOTE: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
10 Taylor originally specified his equation in terms of CPI inflation.
Since the FOMC has stated a preference for PCE measures of
inflation, those measures are used here.in economic activity—peaks and troughs of busi-
ness cycles—are infrequent. Changes in economic
activity as measured by output and employment
are highly persistent. This persistence can be seen
in Figure 3, which shows month-to-month changes
in nonfarm payroll employment from January
1947 through August 2005. During expansions,
employment changes are consistently positive;
during recessions consistently negative. Changes
opposite to the cyclical direction are rare and
generally the consequence of identifiable transi-
tory shocks such as those from strikes and weather
disturbances. This pattern of business cycles gen-
erates strong autocorrelations in the month-to-
month changes in payroll employment, as shown
in Figure 4.11
Given such persistence, once it becomes
apparent that a cyclic peak likely has occurred,
the issue is never whether the Fed will raise the
target funds rate but whether and how much the
Fed will cut the target rate. Similarly, once it is
apparent that an expansion is underway, the ques-
tion is not whether the Fed will cut the target rate,
but the extent and timing of increases.
Data Anomalies
Fed policy responds to incoming informa-
tion, as it should. Sometimes data ought to be
discounted because of anomalous behavior. For
example, the FOMC has indicated that it monitors
inflation developments as measured by the core
rather than the total PCE inflation rate. This
approach is appropriate because the impacts on
inflation of food and energy prices are largely
transitory; the difference between the inflation
rate as measured by the total PCE index and as
measured by the core PCE index fluctuates
around zero. 
Another example was the increase in tobacco
prices in late 1998. Tobacco prices had a transitory
impact on measured inflation, for both total and
Poole
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11 An estimate ARIMA model for monthly changes in nonfarm pay-
roll employment over the period since 1947 indicates that
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Figure 4
Autocorrelations of Monthly Payroll Employment Changes: January 1947–August 2005core indices, during December 1998 and January
1999, but produced no lasting effect on trend
inflation.12 Similarly, information about real
activity sometimes arrives that indicates transitory
shocks to aggregate output and employment. An
example of such a transitory shock is the strike
against General Motors in June and July 1998.13
Similarly, the September 2005 employment
report reflects the impact of Hurricane Katrina.
Transitory and anomalous shocks to the data
are ordinarily rather easy to identify. Both Fed and
market economists develop estimates of these
aberrations in the data shortly after they occur.
The principle of looking through aberrations is
easy to state but probably impossible to formalize
with any precision. We know these shocks when
we see them, but could never construct a com-
pletely comprehensive list of such shocks ex ante.
Policymakers piece together a picture of the
economy from a variety of data, including anec-
dotal observations. When the various observations
fit together to provide a coherent picture, the Fed
can adjust the intended rate with some confidence.
The market generally understands this process, as
it draws similar conclusions from the same data.
Crisis Management
The above rules are suspended when neces-
sary to respond to a financial crisis. The major
examples of the Greenspan era are the stock market
crash of 1987, the combination of financial market
events in late summer and early fall 1998 that
culminated in the near failure of Long Term
Capital Management, crisis avoidance coming
up to the century date change at the end of 1999,
and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In each case, the
nature of the response was tailored to circum-
stances unique to each event. In all cases, crisis
responses were helpful because markets had con-
fidence in the Federal Reserve, including confi-
dence that extra provision of liquidity would be
withdrawn before risking an inflation problem.
In the absence of such confidence, the Fed’s ability
to respond would be severely curtailed.
The history of Fed crisis management since
World War II is generally a happy one. Before the
Greenspan era, significant events include the
failure of Penn Central in 1970 and the near failure
of Continental Illinois in 1984. Perhaps just as
important, the Fed has not responded to certain
events where it was called to do so. Examples
would include the New York City financial crisis
in 1975 and failure of Drexel Burnham Lambert
in 1990.14
Other Regularities in Policy Stance
Since August 1989, the FOMC has adjusted
the intended federal rate in multiples of 25 basis
points only. After February 1994, when the FOMC
first began to announce its policy decision at the
conclusion of its meeting, with few exceptions
all adjustments have been made at regularly
scheduled meetings. These exceptions were
April 18, 1994, September 29, 1998, January 3,
2001, April 18, 2001, and September 17, 2001. 
In general, the Fed can use intermeeting
adjustments to respond to special circumstances,
such as the rate cut on September 17, 2001, in
response to 9/11, or to provide information to the
market about a major change in policy thinking
or direction, such as the rate cut on April 18, 2001.
My own preference is to confine intermeeting
adjustments to circumstances in which delaying
action to the next meeting would have significant
costs. In general, if the market believes that
changed circumstances will lead to a changed
decision at the next regularly scheduled meeting,
then little is gained by acting between meetings.
14 Drexel Burnham Lambert was first investigated by the Securities
and Exchange Commission in late 1987 and charged with securities
fraud in June 1988. A settlement was reached in December 1988,
but the firm declared bankruptcy in February 1990.
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12 From the December 1998 CPI release in January 1999: “Three-
fourths of the December rise in the index for all items less food and
energy was accounted for by a 18.8 percent rise in the index for
cigarettes, reflecting the pass-through to retail of the 45-cents-a-pack
wholesale price increase announced by major tobacco companies
in late November.”
13 From the July 16, 1998, Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.17
Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization press release:
“Industrial production declined 0.6 percent in June after a revised
gain of 0.3 percent in May. Ongoing strikes, which have curtailed
the output of motor vehicles and parts, accounted for the decrease
in industrial production.” From the Employment Situation: July
1998, released August 7, 1998: “Nonfarm payroll employment
edged up by 66,000 to 125.8 million, as growth was curtailed by
strikes and plant shutdowns in automobile-related manufacturing.” By reserving almost all actions to regularly sched-
uled meetings, intermeeting actions have special
force, which can be valuable in meeting financial
crises.
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED
The rules-versus-discretion debate historically
was framed in terms of policy actions. The focus
on policy actions was natural because, historically,
central bankers were reticent to comment on the
rationale for their policy actions and only rarely
provided hints about the future course of policy
actions. Over the past 15 years, as central bankers,
including the FOMC, have striven for greater trans-
parency in monetary policy, communication in
the form of policy statements has moved to center
stage. It is clear that policy statements are just as
important as policy actions, at least in the short
run, because significant market effects can flow
from these statements. We need to face a new
question: Can policy statements become predict-
able? I think the answer in principle is largely in
the affirmative, although evidence on the issue is
scanty and I do not believe that policy statements
are currently highly predictable.
Two significant elements in FOMC policy
statements are the “balance of risks” assessment
introduced in January 2000 and the “forward
looking” language introduced in August 2003. The
balance-of-risks assessment was introduced to
replace the long-standing “bias” statement in the
Directive to the Open Market Desk. Historically,
the bias statement had referred to the intermeeting
period and was not even made public in timely
fashion until May 1999. With the regularization
of FOMC policy actions on scheduled meeting
dates, and issuance of a statement following
every meeting starting with May 1999 to indicate
whether or not the funds rate target was changed,
a consensus emerged among FOMC participants
that the bias formulation did not provide a clear
public communication. The balance-of-risks state-
ment attempted to provide insight into the major
policy concerns of FOMC members over the
“foreseeable future.”
Initially, the Committee sought to summarize
the risks for policy in the foreseeable future in a
single assessment covering the prospects for both
real economic activity and inflation. In June 2003,
the assessment of the risk for sustainable growth
was unbundled from the risk for inflation, allowing
the Committee to express concerns in different
directions about the two risks. Until April 2005,
the balance-of-risks was an unconditional state-
ment; since then, the assessment has been condi-
tioned upon “appropriate monetary policy action.”
Over the 49 FOMC meetings since February
2000, there have been 10 substantive changes in
the wording of the balance-of-risks statement.15
One of these changes was a decision not to make
a balance-of-risks assessment on March 18, 2003,
in light of the uncertainty associated with the
Iraq war. In the remaining 10 formulations of the
statement, 5 assessed the risks as roughly balanced
(or balanced conditional on appropriate policy),
3 indicated concern about economic weakness,
1 indicated concern about heightened inflation
pressures, and 1 indicated a concern about the
risk that inflation might become “undesirably low.” 
The switch in language on December 19, 2000,
from a concern about heightened inflation pres-
sures to economic weakness, was followed by a
reduction in the federal funds target by 50 basis
points at an unscheduled FOMC meeting on
January 3, 2001. On August 13, 2002, the risk
assessment was changed from balanced to
weighted toward economic weakness, but the
FOMC took no policy actions until it reduced the
target for the funds rate by 50 basis points at its
scheduled meeting on November 6, 2002—the sec-
ond FOMC meeting after the change in language.
The risk assessment was changed from balanced
to weighted toward weakness at the May 6, 2003,
scheduled FOMC meeting, and the federal funds
rate target was reduced by 25 basis points at the
subsequent FOMC meeting on June 25, 2003. Prior
to August 2003, no policy actions were under-
taken at a given FOMC meeting or its subsequent
meeting when the risk assessment was balanced.
Beginning in August 2003, the FOMC added
“forward looking” language to the press statement.
Initially, the language indicated that “policy
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15 These changes occurred on December 19, 2000; March 19, 2002;
August 13, 2002; November 6, 2002; March 18, 2003; May 6, 2003;
June 25, 2003; December 9, 2003; May 4, 2004; and March 22, 2005.accommodation can be maintained for a consid-
erable period.” In January 2004, the Committee
changed the language to indicate that it could be
“patient in removing its policy accommodation.”
The FOMC did not change the target federal funds
rate while these statements were in effect. In May
2004, the Committee indicated that it “believes
that policy accommodation can be removed at a
pace that is likely to be measured.” At its following
meeting, the FOMC raised the federal funds rate
target by 25 basis points. The Committee then
raised the target rate by 25 basis points at all its
subsequent meetings up to the time this speech
was written. The most recent such meeting was
September 20, 2005.
At a minimum, the FOMC can and should
aspire to policy statements that are clear and do
not themselves create uncertainty and ambiguity.
The record since 2000 suggests that the balance-
of-risks statement and more recently the forward-
looking language included in the press releases
have provided consistent signals about the direc-
tion of future policy actions.
In interpreting the FOMC’s policy statements,
it is important that each statement be read against
previous ones. Changes in the wording are critical
to understanding the perspective of the FOMC
members about future policy actions. 
RULE ENFORCEMENT
Obviously, there exists no legal enforcement
mechanism of the current rule. Nevertheless,
there are certainly incentives for the Fed Chairman
to follow the rule, or work to define improvements. 
The most powerful incentives arise from
market reactions to Fed policy actions. The federal
funds futures market provides a sensitive measure
of near-term market expectations and the euro-
dollar futures market a sensitive measure of
longer-term funds rate expectations. The spread
between conventional and indexed Treasury secu-
rities provides information on inflation expecta-
tions or, more accurately, inflation compensation.
Options in these markets provide information on
the diffusion of investor expectations. Volatility
of market rates and accompanying market com-
mentary provide quick feedback as to market
reactions to Fed policy actions and policy state-
ments. It is not in the Fed’s interest to confuse or
whipsaw markets, and for this reason market reac-
tions provide an incentive for the Fed to conduct
policy in a predictable fashion that at the same
time achieves policy goals. Policy actions should
be unpredictable only in response to events that
are themselves unpredictable. The response func-
tion itself should be as predictable as possible.
That is, given the arrival of new information, the
goal is that the market should be able to predict
the policy action in response to that information.
Although market responses are the most
important disciplining force, FOMC members
other than the Chairman also provide input,
including input through dissents when a member
feels strongly that a different policy decision
would be better. Reserve Bank directors weigh
in through discount rate decisions. Since 1994,
except in unusual circumstances, the FOMC has
not changed the intended federal funds rate unless
several Reserve Banks have proposed correspon-
ding discount rate changes.16
Finally, the general role of public discussion,
including the highly visible congressional hear-
ings, bears on the process. Skillful public officials
do not want to be forced into a defensive posture
when confronting questions in hearings and in
Q&A sessions following speeches. I’ll leave it to
political scientists to study the matter in detail,
but will guess that public opinion plays a more
important role than formal legal processes in
enforcing many legislated and common law rules.
If so, then public opinion can play an important
role in enforcing extra-legal rules as well.
A SUMMING UP
Federal Reserve policy has become highly
predictable in recent years; in the future this pre-
dictability will, I am sure, be seen as one of the
16 During this period there were 7 occasions when the target funds
rate was changed without an accompanying action by the Board
of Governors to change the discount rate. Of the remaining 36
changes in the intended funds rate, 33 were accompanied by
changes in the discount rate at four or more Federal Reserve Banks.
On 24 of these occasions, the discount rate was changed at a
majority of the Federal Reserve Banks.
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institutionalized, and for this reason the current
Federal Reserve policy rule must be regarded as
somewhat fragile. Still, future Chairmen will want
to extend Alan Greenspan’s successful era and
therefore it will be in their interest to commit to
pursue policy regularities that work well.
I do not claim to have accurately identified
all aspects of the Fed’s current policy rule. I am
tempted to call it the “Greenspan policy rule,”
for Alan Greenspan has surely had far more to
do with its construction than anyone else. Never-
theless, I believe that most elements of the rule
have become part of a general Fed culture, under-
stood at least roughly by other FOMC members
and by staff. While it is appropriate to refer to the
“Greenspan rule,” I believe that FOMC debates
and staff contributions have had a lot to do with
development of the rule. For this reason, I believe
that we should be hopeful that consistent and
predictable Fed policy is likely to continue into
the future.
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